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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DEWEY BUD CAMMACK, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030122-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
•k & Je 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his convictions for theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1999), and forgery, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999), in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Iron County, the Honorable J. 
Philip Eves presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (2003). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Should this Court review defendant's claim of insufficient evidence, where he 
did not preserve the claim below and does not argue plain error on appeal? 
Whether a defendant preserved a claim for appeal is a question that arises for the first 
time on appeal; thus, no standard of review applies. 
2. Did the trial court properly admit defendant's statement, under rules 402 and 
404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, that he did not want to report a real estate transaction 
to the county attorney because the county attorney was "out to get him"? 
The decision by a trial court to admit evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
See State v. Lindgren, 910 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Utah App 1996). 
3. Was defendant prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to continue the 
preliminary hearing so that defendant could obtain counsel of his choice, where 
defendant was convicted by a jury at trial? 
A trial court's refusal to continue a hearing is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 6(b) (stating that court has discretion to enlarge time for any act required "by 
these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of the court"). 
4, Should this Court review defendant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct, 
where defendant did not preserve the claim below and does not argue plain error on 
appeal? 
Whether a defendant preserved a claim for appeal is a question that arises for the first 
time on appeal; thus, no standard of review applies. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following court rules are relevant to this appeal: 
Utah Rules of Evidence 402 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 403 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
2 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 404(b) 
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such 
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, 
the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance 
of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause 
shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A jury convicted defendant of one count of theft and one count of forgery (R. 151-
52). The Court sentenced defendant to two suspended prison terms of zero to five years, a 
$10,000 suspended fine, and thirty-six months probation (R. 196-99, 218-22). Defendant 
filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. (R. 225). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
The Real Estate Deal 
In the November of 2000, Tony and Ramona Granillo of Las Vegas, Nevada 
responded to an ad defendant placed offering to sell 20 acres of land in Iron County (R. 
267:108, 174-75). The Granillos agreed to purchase the land for $35,000 on a real estate 
contract with defendant (R. 267:108, 176; State's Ex. No. 4). On November 5, 2000, the 
Granillos executed a Statement of Buyer's Costs that listed a purchase price of $35,000 (R. 
Except as otherwise noted, this brief recites the facts in the light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,12, 12 P.3d 92. 
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267:176; State's Ex. No. 4). They paid $500 earnest money when they signed the Statement 
of Buyer's Costs and agreed to put down an additional $500 earnest money when they signed 
the real estate contract (R. 267:111; State's Ex. No. 4, 5). 
Defendant mailed a Uniform Real Estate Contract to the Granillos, which they signed 
on December 29, 2000 (R. 267:109-10; State's Ex. No. 3). The contract recited a $35,000 
purchase price with a $1,000 down payment (State's Ex. No. 3). It also provided that the 
balance of the purchase price was to be paid in monthly installments of $334.73 beginning 
on December 10, 2000 (State's Ex. No. 3). The Granillos returned the signed contract to 
defendant with a check for $834.73, representing the balance of the down payment plus the 
first month's payment (R. 267:113; State's Ex. No. 5). Both the contract and the check were 
dated December 29, 2000 (State's Ex. No. 2, 5). 
Defendant Forges a Second Real Estate Contract 
After meeting with the Granillos, but before the Granillos signed the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract, defendant contacted Porter and offered to sell him the Granillo contract for 
$8,500 (R. 267:124-25,133). Porter agreed, and he and defendant executed an Assignment 
of Contract on December 21,2000 (R. 267:125). The assignment provided that Porter was to 
receive the payments due under the Granillo contract and that defendant could repurchase the 
Granillo contract in February for $9,350 (R. 267:126-28, 216-17; State's Ex. No. 6). The 
Granillos had not yet signed the real estate contract, so defendant drew up an identical 
contract and photocopied the Granillos' signatures onto it (R. 267:206-07; State's Ex. No. 
2). This second contract was identical in every respect to the contract defendant sent to the 
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Granillos except that the photocopied signatures were dated November 5,2000, the monthly 
payment was $304.90, and the property description was slightly different (State's Ex. No. 2). 
Defendant gave this second contract to Porter in exchange for $8,500, but did not tell 
Porter that it was invalid or that the Granillos had not yet actually signed the contract (R. 
267:133, 207). He asked Porter not to record the assignment of the contract (R. 267:135). 
Defendant did not tell the Granillos of the assignment, so the Granillos made at least three 
payments totaling $1004.19 to defendant (R. 267:112-14; State's Ex. No. 5). Defendant 
cashed the checks, but never gave the payments to Porter (R. 267:128, 217; State's Ex. No. 
5). 
Defendant's deception did not come to light until, by coincidence, both Porter and 
defendant tried to sell their respective contracts to Tom Comstock (R. 267:79, 81). 
Comstock researched the contracts and contacted the Granillos (R. 267:82-83). He decided 
that Porter's contract was invalid but that Porter had a legal interest in the valid contract 
possessed by defendant (R. 267:82-83, 96). When defendant learned that his forgery had 
been discovered, he approached Porter and tried to exchange the valid contract for the invalid 
contract (R. 267:134). Porter refused because he felt uncomfortable with the transaction and 
was unsure how to proceed (R. 267:134-35). 
Comstock agreed to pay Porter $15,000 for Porter's interest in the valid contract (R. 
267:96, 101). Comstock prepared a letter to the Granillos, which defendant signed, 
acknowledging that defendant had assigned his interest in the contract to Porter and that 
Porter had now assigned his interest to Comstock (R. 267:100,104; Defendant's Ex. No. 7). 
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The letter instructed the Granillos to remit their next payment to Comstock through Southern 
Utah Title (R. 267:104; Defendant's Ex. No. 7). 
The Trial 
The State charged defendant with one count of second degree theft and one count of 
forgery (R. 1-3). At trial, the State sought to introduce evidence that Porter had encouraged 
defendant to report their transaction to the authorities and that defendant was reluctant to do 
so, because the county attorney was "out to get [him]" (R. 267:137). Defendant objected (R. 
267:137) He reminded the court that it had previously ruled that the State could not 
introduce evidence of defendant's probation agreement with the county attorney's office (R. 
267:156). Defendant then asserted that in order to explain the context of the statement to the 
jury, he would need to reveal the existence of the probation agreement (R. 267:156-57). 
Defendant also claimed the statement was irrelevant (R. 267:156-57). The trial court 
overruled defendant's objection (R. 267:137, 155). It reasoned that defendant's statement 
was probative of his consciousness of guilt and, though ambiguous, could be construed to 
indicated that defendant knew he had committed a crime (R. 267:155). 
Defendant testified at trial that he photocopied the Granillos' signatures onto the 
contract he sold to Porter (R. 267:206). He claimed that the forged contract was an "example 
contract" he created (R. 267:180, 206). He confessed on cross-examination, however, that 
he "made up" the example contract and had "never heard of one before" (R. 267:206). He 
also admitted that, according to the contract, Porter was to receive the Granillos' payments 
and that defendant never gave Porter any of those payments (R. 267:216-17). He also 
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acknowledged that the "example contract" was not a binding contract, but that he let Porter 
believe it was (EL 267:224). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. Defendant never objected to the sufficiency of the evidence in the trial 
court and has not claimed plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. He has 
therefore waived this claim. 
POINT II. Evidence of defendant's reluctance to go to the authorities was relevant to 
demonstrate his consciousness of guilt. It is not evidence of prior bad acts or prior crimes 
and not substantially more prejudicial than probative. The evidence is not, therefore, 
excludable under rule 403 or 404, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
POINT III. A jury's verdict renders harmless any errors or misconduct in the 
preliminary hearing. Defendant's claim that he was denied the assistance of counsel at the 
preliminary hearing is therefore mooted by the jury's verdict. 
POINT IV. Defendant did not preserve his claim of prosecutorial misconduct and 
has not claimed plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. The claim is therefore 
waived. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVIEW DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF 
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE BECAUSE IT WAS NOT PRESERVED 
BELOW; MOREOVER, THE CLAIM HAS NO MERIT 
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for 
forgery and theft because Porter received more than he bargained for. Aplt. Br. at 18-23. 
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He concludes that Porter's windfall negated any actual theft and also negated any intent to 
defraud. Aplt. Br. at 19, 21. 
As explained below, defendant's claim is meritless. 
A. Defendant did not preserve his claim for appeal and did not assert 
plain error or exceptional circumstances in his opening brief. 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on 
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 11,10 P.3d 346. This "rule applies to every claim, 
including constitutional questions . . ." Id. To properly preserve a claim, a party must 
present the objection to the trial court, state the grounds for the objection specifically and 
distinctly, and ensure that the objection and its supporting arguments become part of the trial 
record. See State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141,1144 (Utah 1989); State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 
358, 361 (Utah App. 1993). In the context of claims of insufficient evidence, the 
preservation rule "prevents] a defendant from deliberately foregoing relief below on the 
sufficiency of the evidence, hoping that a remediable evidentiary defect might not be 
perceived and corrected, thus strategically facilitating the defendant's chance for a reversal 
on appeal." Holgate 2000 UT 74, If 16. 
This Court may review an unpreserved claim only if it finds exceptional 
circumstances or plain error Id. at j^ 11. Appellants must, however, raise plain error and 
exceptional circumstances in their opening brief, otherwise the claim is waived. See Brown 
v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, \ 23, 16 P.3d 540 ("Generally, issues raised by an appellant in the 
reply brief that were not presented in the opening brief are considered waived and will not be 
considered by the appellate court."); State v. Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, ^  12 n.4, 63 P.3d 
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110 (refusing to consider robbery defendant's unpreserved claim that State never proved that 
he had purpose to deprive where defendant raised plain error for the first time in reply brief); 
State v. Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, \ 33 n.5, 64 P.3d 1218 (refusing to consider defendant's 
unpreserved claim that jury instructions were incorrect where defendant raised plain error for 
first time in reply brief); cf. Utah R. App. P. 24(c) ("Reply briefs shall be limited to 
answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief"). This rule prevents "unfairness 
to the respondent if an argument or issue [is] first raised in the reply brief and the respondent 
[has] no opportunity to respond." Glover, 2000 UT 895 ^ f 23. 
Defendant never objected to the sufficiency of the evidence in the trial court. He did 
not move for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case, and he did not make any pre-
or post-verdict motions that would have allowed the trial court to consider and rule on the 
sufficiency of the evidence (R. 160-62; 267:172, 225, 272). Defendant has not preserved 
this issue for appeal and thus may only maintain his claim of insufficient evidence by 
asserting plain error or exceptional circumstances. Defendant has not, however, argued plain 
error or exceptional circumstances in his opening brief. He may not raise those claims for 
the first time in his reply brief Hence, defendant's claim of insufficient evidence fails. 
B. Defendant did not properly marshal the evidence. 
This Court should also refuse to consider defendant's claims because he did not 
properly marshal the evidence. 
When a defendant attacks a conviction on the sufficiency of the evidence, he must 
first marshal all of the evidence supporting the conviction and then demonstrate to the Court 
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how the evidence is insufficient. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Proper marshalling requires 
the appellant to present, "in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists. After 
constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a 
fatal flaw in the evidence." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 
(Utah. App. 1991). Merely reviewing all the evidence before the fact finder is insufficient. 
See Heinecke v. Dep't of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 464 (Utah App. 1991) (finding that 
defendant failed to satisfy marshaling obligation where he "reviewed in minute detail all the 
evidence" and "left it to the court to sort out what evidence actually supported the findings"). 
Rather, "[c]ounsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully assume 
the adversary's position." Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d at 1315. Failure to meet the 
marshaling burden is grounds to reject an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence. See, e.g., 
State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98,1j 16, 989 P.2d 1065; Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 
789, 800 (Utah 1991). 
Defendant never presents a single, unified compilation of the facts supporting his 
guilt. His Statement of Facts weaves together inculpatory and exculpatory facts, and even 
omits crucial facts. See Aplt. Br. at 11-15. For example, defendant's brief fails to mention 
that, after defendant assigned the Granillo contract to Porter, the Granillos made three 
monthly payments on the contract to defendant, who cashed the payments and kept the 
money for himself (R. 267:112-14,128,217; State's Ex. No. 5). This crucial fact was likely 
the basis for the jury finding that defendant committed third degree theft. Defendant has thus 
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"left it to the [CJourt to sort out what evidence actually supported the findings" and even 
omitted important evidence. Heinecke, 810 P.2d at 464. This Court should therefore reject 
his claim. 
C. The evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of theft and forgery. 
Even if defendant had preserved his claim for appeal and properly marshaled the 
facts, his claim would still fail because the evidence was sufficient. This Court reviews the 
evidence presented at trial in a light most favorable to the verdict. See State v. Colwell, 2000 
UT 8, f 42,994 P.2d 177. "A jury conviction will be reversed for insufficient evidence 'only 
if the evidence presented at trial is so insufficient that reasonable minds could not have 
reached the verdict.'" State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, \ 74, 28 P.3d 1278 (quoting State v. 
Colwell 2000 UT 8, % 40, 994 P.2d 177). 
1. Defendant committed theft 
The crime of third degree theft requires the State to prove that defendant obtained or 
exercised unauthorized control over property of another valued at more than $1000 with a 
purpose to deprive him thereof. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404; Utah Code Ann. 76-6-
412(l)(b). 
Both defendant and Terry Porter testified at trial that defendant assigned his interest in 
the Granillos contract to Porter for $8,500 and that, under the contract, Porter was to receive 
the monthly payments (R. 267:126-28,216; State's Ex. No. 6). The Granillos made monthly 
payments totaling $1004.19 to defendant, who never remitted any of those payments to 
Porter (R. 267:128, 217; State's Ex. No. 5). Instead, he cashed the Granillos' checks and 
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kept the money (State's Ex. No. 5). The jury could thus have found defendant guilty of theft 
for misappropriating $1004.19 in contractual payments from the Granillos. The jury could 
infer purpose to deprive from the fact that defendant knew under the contract that the 
payments belonged to Porter yet never, even after he was caught, gave those payments to 
Porter. 
Defendant claims that the evidence does not sustain a theft conviction because "Porter 
appears to have benefitted [sic] beyond the terms of his agreement and therefore it is difficult 
to see how theft was committed against him." Aplt. Br. at 19. Defendant's argument 
misconstrues the law. A person commits theft if he or she exercises unauthorized control 
over the property of another with the purpose to deprive. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404. 
When defendant misappropriated the Granillos' payments, he manifested the necessary acts 
and state of mind to be convicted of theft. Porter's subsequent sale of the Granillo contract 
for more than he paid for it does not nullify defendant's theft. Under the terms of the 
assignment, Porter was entitled to both the monthly payments and any proceeds from the sale 
of the contract (State's Ex. No. 6). 
2. Defendant committed forgery. 
Forgery occurs when a person "makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, 
transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, 
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to be the 
act of another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(l)(b). The crime of forgery requires that the 
defendant act "with purpose to defraud anyone." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1) (1999). 
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This Court has defined fraud as "an intentional misrepresentation offered for the purpose of 
inducing reliance upon it to gain some advantage." State ex rel P.S., 2001 UT App 305, \ 
17, 38 P.3d 303. A factfinder may infer intent to defraud from the act of signing another's 
name, but there must be a connection between the fraudulent act and the fraudulent intent. 
See State v. Winward, 909 P.2d 909, 912-13 (Utah App. 1995); State v. Williams, 111 P.2d 
220, 223 (Utah 1985). "[A] defendant who has signed another's name without permission, 
while possessing an intent to defraud that is completely unrelated to the unauthorized 
endorsement, has not committed forgery." Winward, 909 P.2d at 913. 
Defendant admitted that he photocopied the Granillo's signatures onto the real estate 
contract he sold to Porter (R. 267:206). He never told Porter that the real estate contract was 
a forgery and, in fact, tried to sell the valid contract to Tom Comstock (R. 267:134-35,138— 
39, 221). The jury could reasonably infer from those facts that defendant forged the 
Granillo's signatures for the purpose of defrauding Porter out of $8,500. 
Defendant claims the evidence of forgery was insufficient because the State never 
proved intent to defraud. Aplt. Br. at 21. Specifically, he claims that evidence that 
defendant attempted to give Porter the valid contract in exchange for the forged contract 
negates any inference of intent to defraud Porter. Aplt. Br. at 21. Defendant did not do so, 
however, until his forgery was discovered by Tom Comstock (R. 267:139). At that point the 
crime had been completed. Moreover, if an offer to rectify a fraud were sufficient to negate 
an inference of intent to defraud, then forgers could always escape conviction by simply 
offering to correct the forgery if and when they were caught. 
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Defendant also claims that there was no fraud because Porter received more than he 
bargained for. Aplt. Br. at 21. This claims fails with respect to the forgery conviction for the 
same reason it fails for the theft conviction. Porter's subsequent windfall does not negate 
defendant's prior criminal act and criminal intent, especially where defendant did not attempt 
to remedy his criminal actions until he was caught (R. 267:139). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED EVIDENCE THAT 
DEFENDANT DID NOT WANT THE TRANSACTION REPORTED TO 
THE COUNTY ATTORNEY; MOREOVER, THE WEIGHT OF THE 
EVIDENCE RENDERED ANY ERROR HARMLESS 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted the State 
to ask Porter about defendant's response to Porter's suggestion that defendant report the 
transaction to the authorities. Aplt. Br. at 23. Specifically, defendant claims that his 
response was irrelevant and that it was inadmissible evidence of prior crimes. Aplt. Br. at 
23-24. 
A. Defendant's response was relevant to show defendant's criminal intent. 
"All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution 
of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by 
other rules applicable in courts of this state." Utah R. Evid. 402. Thus, the testimony of 
defendant's reluctance to contact the authorities was proper if the evidence was relevant and 
did not violate any other rule of evidence. 
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would 
be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. "[T]he standard for determining the relevancy 
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of evidence is very low, and even evidence with the slightest probative value is relevant." 
State v. Martin, 2002 UT 34, % 34, 44 P.3d 805 (quotations omitted); see also Jaeger, 1999 
UT 1, \ 12; State v. Smedley, 2003 UT App 79, f 15, 67 P.3d 1005. 
In the instant case, the State asked Porter, "When you encouraged Mr. Cammack to go 
to the authorities, what did he tell you?" (R. 267:137). Porter replied, "He said that he 
couldn't do tha t . . . because the county attorney's office was - 1 can't remember the exact 
words, like they're out to get me, they have my number or, you know, like you know what 
they would do to me or something along that line" (R. 267:137-38). The trial court ruled 
that the evidence was relevant to defendant's state of mind and tended to show that defendant 
understood that his activities might have constituted a crime (R. 267:155). The trial court 
acknowledged, however, that the statement was ambiguous and that the jury should 
determine the meaning (R. 267:155). 
Defendant's reluctance to go the authorities is analogous to a perpetrator's flight from 
police. The jury may, but need not, infer consciousness of guilt from a person's flight. See 
State v. Riggs, 1999 UT App 2714 14,987 P.2d 1281 (approving flight instruction that told 
jury that it may infer consciousness of guilt from flight). While defendant did not physically 
run from the county attorney, his desire to conceal his actions from the authorities is 
similarly indicative of a guilty mind. It demonstrated that, contrary to defendant's claims at 
trial, defendant knew that he had broken the law when he sold a forged real estate contract to 
Porter and misappropriated the monthly payments on the contract. Defendant's response 
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thus had some probative value and was properly admitted unless excludable under some 
other rule of evidence. 
Defendant asserts that his reluctance to contact the authorities was irrelevant because 
it occurred "long after the execution of the assignment." Aplt. Br. at 23. The length of time 
between the forgery and the statement, however, does not negate the statement's probative 
value. The statement is evidence of defendant's consciousness of guilt, not of his state of 
mind when he committed the crime. 
B. Porter's testimony was not evidence of prior criminal acts; moreover, 
it was submitted for a proper non-character purpose. 
Defendant asserts that Porter's testimony "more or less opened the door to making 
mention of prior criminal acts of [defendant]." Aplt. Br. at 23. He claims the testimony was 
inadmissible character evidence because it had no purpose other than "to disgrace the 
defendant as a person of evil character with a propensity to commit crime." Aplt. Br. at 24. 
Evidence of prior crimes is not admissible to "to prove the character of a person in 
order to show action in conformity therewith." Utah R. Evid. 404(b). Evidence of prior 
crimes is admissible, however, for non-character purposes "such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident." Utah R. Evid. 404(b). In other words, "[e]vidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or bad 
acts is admissible 'if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the requirements of 
Rules 402 and 403.'" State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, H 25, 52 P.3d 1194 (quotingUtahR. 
Evid, 404(b) (pre-2001 amendment)). 
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In the instant case, defendant admits that Porter's testimony itself is not evidence of 
prior crimes, but rather, only "opened the door to making mention of prior criminal acts." 
Aplt. Br. at 23. Defendant never explains why rule 404(b) should apply to evidence that 
merely opens the door to making mention of prior crimes, and this Court should refuse to do 
so for him. See State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ][ 31, 973 P.2d 404 (stating that court is not "a 
depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research"). 
Even if rule 404(b) does apply, however, defendant's claim still fails because, as 
explained above, the prosecutor offered the evidence for a proper non-character purpose: to 
show defendant's consciousness of guilt. Additionally, the relevance of the testimony was 
not "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury" Utah. R. Evid. 403. The jury never learned of defendant's probation 
agreement or the crimes which preceded the agreement. No reasonable person would infer 
from the statement alone that defendant had previously been convicted of a crime. 
Defendant correctly acknowledges that "when relevant evidence is admissible for one 
purpose and inadmissible for another purpose, the trial judge upon request shall restrict the 
evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly." Aplt. Br. at 24-25 (emphasis 
added). As explained below, however, defendant never requested a limiting instruction and 
has therefore waived the issue. 
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C. Defendant did not request a limiting instruction and did not object to 
the jury instruction on forgery and has therefore waived any claims 
regarding those issues. 
Defendant asserts that the trial court should have issued a limiting instruction 
regarding Porter's testimony that defendant was reluctant to contract the authorities. Aplt. 
Br. at 23-25. Defendant admits, however, that he never requested such an instruction and 
hence his claim "may have been waived." Aplt. Br. at 25. Defendant is correct. His trial 
counsel never asked the court to instruct the jury on the proper scope of the testimony of 
defendant's reluctance to contact the authorities. Defendant has not argued plain error or 
exceptional circumstances on appeal. Thus, the claim is waived. See State v. Rocco, 795 
P.2d 1116,1119 (Utah 1990) (holding that failure to request limiting instruction constitutes 
waiver of any claim that the court should have issued an instruction). 
Defendant also asserts that the jury instruction on forgery did not adequately apprise 
the jury that to convict him of forgery it must find a connection between his act of forgery 
and his fraudulent intent. Aplt. Br. at 25. Defendant, however, never objected to the forgery 
instruction and, in fact, approved the instructions before they were read to the jury (R. 
267:227). Defendant has therefore waived this claim because he did not preserve it below 
and has not claimed plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. See Utah R. Crim. 
P. 19(e) ("Unless a party objects to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the 
instruction may not be assigned as error except to avoid a manifest injustice."); State v. 
Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 269 (Utah 1998) (holding that defendant waived claim of error in 
jury instructions where he did not object at trial to instructions); State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 
18 
688, 700-01 (Utah App. 1995) (refusing to consider defendant's claim of error in the jury 
instructions where defendant approved instructions at trial). 
D. The admission of defendant's statement was, at most, harmless 
because defendant admitted the elements of theft and forgery in his 
trial testimony, 
"[A]n appellate court will not overturn a jury verdict for the admission of improper 
evidence if the admission of the evidence did not reasonably effect the likelihood of a 
different verdict." State v. Houskeeper, 2002 UT 118, If 26, 62 P.3d 444. 
Exclusion of the testimony of defendant's reluctance to go to the authorities would not 
have changed the outcome of the trial because defendant essentially confessed at trial. 
Defendant's own testimony established that he exercised unauthorized control over the 
property of another valued at more than $ 1,000 with intent to deprive. See Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-404. Defendant admitted that the Assignment of Contract entitled Porter to the 
monthly payments on the Granillo real estate contract (R. 267:216). Defendant 
acknowledged that he had drafted the assignment contract and that it was clear from the 
language of the contract that Porter was entitled to the payments (R. 267:215-16). 
Defendant also admitted that he never gave Porter any of the Granillos' monthly payments 
and that when Porter had asked if any payments had been made, defendant had lied and had 
told him that the Granillos had only made one payment (R. 267:216-17). He also admitted 
that he never returned the payments to the Granillos (R. 267:220). 
Defendant's own testimony also established that he made a writing that purported to 
be the act of another for the purpose of defrauding Terry Porter. See Utah Code Ann. §76-6-
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501. Defendant confessed that he photocopied the Granillos's signatures onto a real estate 
contract and sold it to Porter for $8,500 (R. 267:206). He admitted that he let Porter believe 
that the contract was valid and never told him about the second contract that the Granillos 
actually signed (R. 267:207, 224). Defendant then confessed that he never returned the 
$8,500 to Porter (R. 267:221). 
Thus, defendant confessed in open court to all the elements of theft and forgery and 
any error in admitting evidence of his reluctance to contact the authorities was harmless. 
III. DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS DEPRIVED OF THE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING 
LACKS RECORD SUPPORT AND IS MOOTED BY THE JURY'S 
GUILTY VERDICT 
Defendant asserts that he was denied the assistance of counsel at the preliminary 
hearing when the trial court refused to continue the hearing so that he could retain counsel. 
Aplt. Br. at 26. He asserts that this error was "fundamental" and "can not be considered in 
any light other than an error of substantial and prejudicial impact." Aplt. Br. at 27. 
Defendant has failed to provide an adequate record to support his claim. "Parties 
claiming error below and seeking appellate review have the duty and responsibility to 
support their allegations with an adequate record." State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 
1993); State v. Penman, 964 P.2dll57,1162 (Utah App. 1998). "'When crucial matters are 
not included in the record, the missing portions are presumed to support the action of the trial 
court.'" State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 2 4 4 13,69 P.3d 1278 (quoting State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 
1386, 1388 (Utah 1988)). "Consequently, in the face of'an [inadequate record on appeal 
[this Court] must assume the regularity of the proceedings below.'" Penman, 964 P.2d at 
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1162 (quoting State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403,405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam)) (first alteration in 
original); see also Wetzel, 868 P.2d at 67; State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 699 (Utah App. 
1995). 
Defendant has not provided a transcript of the preliminary hearing, so the minute 
entry of the preliminary hearing provides the only evidence of his claim(R. 34-35). The 
minute entry indicates that defendant was present at the hearing without counsel (R. 35). 
Defendant requested a continuance to retain counsel (R. 35). The State opposed a 
continuance, and the trial court denied defendant's request (R. 35). The preliminary hearing 
was held the same day with defendant representing himself (R. 34-35). The minute entry 
provides no explanation for the State's objection or the court's ruling (R. 35). Defendant 
asserts, without citation to the record, that the prosecutor objected to the continuance because 
of inconvenience to the witnesses. Aplt. Br. at 26-27. Without a record of why the State 
objected and why the trial court denied defendant's motion, this Court must assume that the 
objection and ruling were grounded in the law and thus proper. See Penman, 964 P.2d at 
1162. 
Defendant's claim also is mooted by the jury's verdict. Once a jury renders a guilty 
verdict, any error or misconduct in the preliminary hearing becomes harmless. See State v. 
Whittle, 1999 UT 96, \ 13, 989 P.2d 52 (holding that prosecutorial misconduct during grand 
jury proceedings was mooted by subsequent petit jury verdict of guilty); State v. Quas, 837 
P.2d 565, 567 (Utah App. 1992) (holding that guilty verdict mooted question as to whether 
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information should have been quashed); State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 467 n. 6 (Utah 
1991) (noting that challenges to magistrate's bindover order are mooted by guilty verdict). 
IV. DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE HIS CLAIM OF 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct when he 
used the word "bogus" during trial to describe the forged real estate contract. Aplt. Br. at 27. 
He claims that his trial counsel objected to the word and that the trial court sustained the 
objection. 
The prosecutor described the forged contract as "bogus" several times throughout the 
trial including during opening argument, during the testimonies of Tom Comstock, Terry 
Porter, and defendant, and during closing argument (R. 267:62,64,102,134,139,153,224, 
268, 247, 269). Defendant never object to the prosecutor's use of the word. Defendant 
claims in his brief that his trial counsel objected during Terry Porter's testimony on page 153 
of the trial transcript. Aplt. Br. at 27. That objection, however, was not to the word "bogus," 
but rather, to the prosecutor asking a question which had already been asked and answered. 
Defendant did not preserve his claim and has not argued plain error or exceptional 
circumstances; his claim therefore fails. See Glover, 2000 UT 89, \ 23. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions 
Respectfully submitted March 5, 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MATTHEW D. BATES 
Assistant Attorney General 
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